4.4. How Data Informs Ethics#
Think for a minute about consequentialism. On this view, we should do whatever results in the best outcomes for the most people. One of the classic forms of this approach is utilitarianism, which says we should do whatever maximizes ‘utility’ for most people. Confusingly, ‘utility’ in this case does not refer to usefulness, but to a sort of combo of happiness and wellbeing. When a utilitarian tries to decide how to act, they take stock of all the probable outcomes, and what sort of ‘utility’ or happiness will be brought about for all parties involved. This process is sometimes referred to by philosophers as ‘utility calculus’. When I am trying to calculate the expected net utility gain from a projected set of actions, I am engaging in ‘utility calculus’ (or, in normal words, utility calculations).
Now, there are many reasons one might be suspicious about utilitarianism as a cheat code for acting morally, but let’s assume for a moment that utilitarianism is the best way to go. When you undertake your utility calculus, you are, in essence, gathering and responding to data about the projected outcomes of a situation. This means that how you gather your data will affect what data you come up with. If you have really comprehensive data about potential outcomes, then your utility calculus will be more complicated, but will also be more realistic. On the other hand, if you have only partial data, the results of your utility calculus may become skewed. If you think about the potential impact of a set of actions on all the people you know and like, but fail to consider the impact on people you do not happen to know, then you might think those actions would lead to a huge gain in utility, or happiness.
When we think about how data is used online, the idea of a utility calculus can help remind us to check whether we’ve really got enough data about how all parties might be impacted by some actions. Even if you are not a utilitarian, it is good to remind ourselves to check that we’ve got all the data before doing our calculus. This can be especially important when there is a strong social trend to overlook certain data. Such trends, which philosophers call ‘pernicious ignorance’, enable us to overlook inconvenient bits of data to make our utility calculus easier or more likely to turn out in favor of a preferred course of action.
Can you think of an example of pernicious ignorance in social media interaction? What’s something that we might often prefer to overlook when deciding what is important?
One classic example is the tendency to overlook the interests of children and/or people abroad when we post about travels, especially when fundraising for ‘charity tourism’. One could go abroad, and take a picture of a cute kid running through a field, or a selfie with kids one had traveled to help out. It was easy, in such situations, to decide the likely utility of posting the photo on social media based on the interest it would generate for us, without thinking about the ethics of using photos of minors without their consent. This was called out by The Onion in a parody article, titled “6-Day Visit To Rural African Village Completely Changes Woman’s Facebook Profile Picture” [d31].
The reckoning about how pernicious ignorance had allowed many to feel comfortable leaving the interests of many out of the utility calculus for use of images online continued. You can read an article about it here [d32], or see a similar reckoning discussed by National Geographic: “For Decades, Our Coverage Was Racist. To Rise Above Our Past, We Must Acknowledge It” [d33].
4.4.1. Read more:#
The calculus of ignorance by Thomas T. Hills [d34]
Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance by Shannon Sullivan, Nancy Tuana [d35]
Search Engines, White Ignorance, and the Social Epistemology of Technology by Joshua Habgood-Coote (forthcoming)[d36]